“The world of today, in an upheaval of antagonisms heading toward destructive war, was not inevitable. Russia need not have fallen to the Bolsheviks; Germany to the Nazis; Italy to the Fascists. The United States need not have entered the World War. Two millions of men slain in battle need not have died. These consequences resulted from a decision of a few men during the World War.” –Author Unknown, 1938 2
World War II had its roots in World War I. The Nazi Party, likewise, gained its foothold in Germany due to the social and economic aftermath of World War I. When the German artillery ceased firing on Nov. 11, 1918, German troops in the field had no real understanding as to why. “The myth grew among many of these surrendered German soldiers that they had been stabbed in the back: that the front line troops and the 2 million German war dead had been betrayed by German Marxists and Jews who had fomented dissent back home.”4 It was during this time that bitterness began to grow within the overall mindset of average Germans. Starvation and sickness plagued the German people as they attempted to recover their decimated economy as well as establish a new form of government. Dissention to the point of violence erupted between and among the various German political parties as each fought to establish themselves as the popular governmental frontrunner.4
It was during this time that World War I Corporal Adolf Hitler was introduced into the political arena. His hatred of Marxists and Jews combined with his belief in the “iniquity of the Versailles Peace Treaty signed at the end of World War I” to create a dangerous political mix. Through this highly significant “peacekeeping” document that officially ended the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Entente Powers, Germany lost much of her pre-war territorial holdings to the aforementioned Triple Entente (England, France, and the United States) and was also forced to pay them exorbitant reparations. Inflation skyrocketed which helped send the post-war economy into a freefall. Also as a result of the Treaty, French troops were sent into Germany as a type of occupying police force as well as to ensure reparations payments were being made.7 With mounting desperation, Germany began looking for a strong leader to bring them out of this dark age. “Versailles was a crime, and the Jews were behind it” became one of the primary cries of the newly-formed Nazi Party, a cry that resonated with the German people. German resident and Nazi Party Member, Jutta Rudiger, remembers that, “There was a lot of official harassment. There was widespread hunger, squalor, and poverty, and—what really affected us—there was humiliation. The French ruled with an iron hand. Perhaps they simply wanted to take revenge.”4
The purpose of the Treaty of Versailles was, ostensibly, to put an end to the first World War and to make Germany pay for what it had done to harm multiple nations. Its significance within the annals of history is that it helped send the defeated nation downward-spiraling into poverty and desperation. Had the terms been more lenient, perhaps the perceived need for a leader such as Hitler and his Nazi Party could have been avoided. The military restrictions put into place made sense at the time, but the economic sanctions inflicted upon the war-torn population could only serve to bring about long-term debilitation.
During the 1920s, the German economy recovered reducing their desperate demand for dramatic political change. The Nazis took a backseat during this time of measurable prosperity, but once the Great Depression struck the global economy full force and Germany became once again impoverished, Hitler’s promises of national salvation pushed he and his ideology into the spotlight once more. Here was a powerful speaker whose vehement words resonated with the agonizing German people. Here was a man who at least seemed to have a firm plan in hand. Here was a man with the timely answers needed to, once and for all, restore Germany to a place of respect and power on a global scale.4
Interestingly but not surprisingly, Germany’s government—as with many governments worldwide—already had an affinity for the widespread use of propaganda for the furthering of national good. For example, one primary source document entitled “German Schools and the Teaching of War” written in 1922 indicates a shielding of the younger generation from the truth about World War I. Most of the schools within Germany used different textbooks, each of which stressed different aspects and perceptions of their nation’s history. Problems began to arise because “there was such a discrepancy between the various books that the explanations of the school officials were highly entertaining.”1 A Dr. Becker, secretary of the Prussian ministry of education stated that, “There are two things that we are not teaching our children. One subject that is forbidden is the Kaiser and his dynasty. The other is the war.”1 Dr. Becker goes on to admit that this is done on purpose. “It’s politics. You see, there are six different parties in Prussia. Each different party has a different idea about the causes of the war, the events, and the mistakes. As soon as the ministries of education start to prepare a story of the war for the school children, some leader of a party arises and says that the story is wrong, in some detail.”1
The purpose and meaning of such a document is obvious: to educate the rest of the world on one of the many post-war states of affairs within the defeated Germany. The significance of this document is overwhelming in that it clearly demonstrates a serious lack of “real” education within the German public school system. By remaining ignorant of this globe-altering event and the circumstances that caused it, how could the younger generation ever be expected to prevent a second globe-altering event? Unless one may learn from the mistakes and missteps of the past, one shall indeed repeat said mistakes. Many of these children were destined to become the Hitler Youth. Could a more thorough education of their own immediate past have helped prevent at least some of the atrocities to come?
An American correspondent living in 1919 Europe further underscores the new, post-war German government’s instability and inability to effect long-term change. In the article “First Political Crisis of the New Germany,” the author observes, “The great fact to the outside world is that a German parliament has actually precipitated a crisis. It threw out the Scheklemann cabinet. It presided over the birth of the Bauer one. It was the German parliament which dictated to the government regarding its composition, instead of meekly obeying the government, as had been the custom.”2 Such a document would reveal to the world an ongoing, rampant disorganization within the supposedly-reorganizing fledgling German government. Such a revelation could only inspire global distrust of and lack of confidence in a new government desperately attempting to rebuild and restructure. Any financial assistance in the way of loans and other economic investments would become far less likely at a time when Germany needed such things most.
By now, Hitler had assembled a group of men who either shared his racist beliefs or craved power badly enough to go along with them. Among this Chosen Few was a man by the name of Josef Goebbels, the mastermind behind Hitler’s vastly successful propaganda machine. In order to facilitate this propaganda, Goebbels took direct aim at the inherent hatred of the “World Jewry” by the German people. He reinforced a belief that the Jews were conspiring against the entire nation and attempting to take complete control. When asked how they—the German people as well as the Nazi Party—could have considered it right to discriminate against and drive a particular group of people (the Jews) from their homes and lives, Bruno Hahnel, a Hitler Youth leader from 1927-1945, replies that, “Well, if it were the case that they were innocent people, then that is correct. It wasn’t to be done. But I have to come back to World Jewry. For us it was World Jewry which wanted to gain power, which wanted to rule the world. Because of this whole propaganda, the demand to remove them from public life was understandable.”4 Because Germany was desperate for any change that would improve their situation, they were willing to accept any leadership that might bring about such a miracle. Likewise, the Jews were a threat to the survival of Germany and its traditions, and the Nazi Party was just the party to both unify and rescue the fatherland’s Master Race. Jutta Rutiger further recalls that, “I can only explain this with the desperation and poverty caused by the mass unemployment (during the Depression). It was really terrible, and in this situation Hitler seemed to be the bringer of salvation.”4
These first-hand observations and recollections made by actual Nazi Party members from the time of Hitler’s rise to power help us better understand just how an intelligent group of people could be so beaten down that they would eventually accept the Nazi ideology. They remind us that any person or group of people, when in dire straits for an extended length of time without hope of relief, will resort to even the most ridiculous of solutions if they truly believe them to be a solution. Erna Kranz, a resident of Munich during the Nazi era, sums up the situation effectively when she declares, “It definitely was a positive thing. Why, otherwise, did the masses follow this man? Why? There must have been a reason. That’s the way it was, a lot of things got better. Everything got a little better. Certainly concerning our own household, things were improving.”4
These primary source responses also demonstrate how easily a government or political party—through the systematic use of carefully-manipulated propaganda—can control the minds of its population by catering to said population’s pre-existing fears and prejudices. The Nazi Party built upon a latent distrust and hatred of the Jews in particular to foist themselves into power, and the honest admissions of these one-time Nazi supporters describe just how easily it was done.
It was within this national culture and
mindset that the Hitler-appointed Josef Goebbels was able to work his
ideological magic. In the article
“Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda,” Leonard Doob references Josef Goebbels
own personal journal as he describes the process utilized by the German
propaganda officer for formulating his successful campaigns:
1.
Propagandists
must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion
2.
Propaganda
must be planned and executed by only one authority
3.
The
propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action
4.
Propaganda
must affect the enemy’s policy and action
5.
Declassified,
operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign
6.
To
be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be
transmitted through an attention-getting communications medium
7.
Credibility
alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false
8.
The
purpose, content, and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and
effects of an expose; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determined
whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refuted
9.
Credibility,
intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda
materials should be censored
10.
Material
from enemy propaganda may be utilized in operations when it helps diminish that
enemy’s prestige or lends support to the propagandist’s own objective
11.
Black
rather than white propaganda must be employed when the latter is less credible
or produces undesirable effects
12.
Propaganda
may be facilitated by leaders with prestige
13.
Propaganda
must be carefully timed
14.
Propaganda
must label events and people with distinctive phrases or slogans
15.
Propaganda
to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted
by future events
16.
Propaganda
to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level
17.
Propaganda
to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration
18.
Propaganda
must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets for
hatred
19.
Propaganda
cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some
form of action or diversion, or both 5
We may therefore see the diabolical,
methodical application of these very principles to Goebbels’ every public
action during his time in power. He skillfully
targets the long-held German opinion that Jews are evil, they are intent upon
destroying age-old German traditions, and that they will ultimately take full
control of German society thereby destroying their superior way of life
forever. Specifically, Nazi propaganda
appealed directly to German feelings of “national unity based upon the
principle of volksgemeinschaft, or
‘the community before the individual’.”
This included stressing a “need for racial purity, a hatred of enemies
which increasingly centered on Jews and Bolsheviks, and (a need for) charismatic
leadership.”3
Additionally, Hitler’s philosophies
stressed the need for order to the point that they became obsessed with the
subject. Part of his propagandist
efforts went into the lavish productions of pageants and parades intended to
glorify the perfect human form: that of a “pure” German. And it was only those considered to be
“racially pure” Germans who were allowed to participate. Erna Kranz recalls her own inclusion in the
extravagant “Night of the Amazons” staged in Munich: “I was a Madame Pompadour
with a very low-cut neckline and a hoop skirt.
I felt it was beautiful. There
was a certain arrogance—that Germans were somehow special. It was said that the German people should be
a pure race, that they should stand above others.”4 In direct contrast to these displays of
Aryan perfection and beauty, elsewhere in Munich at this very same time,
property belonging to Jews was being confiscated and their jobs systematically
eliminated. They were even banned from
most career paths. The Gestapo began
making its presence known on a more massive scale as they enlisted the help of
“ordinary citizens” to denounce potential dissidents. Anyone with Jewish features was automatically
targeted.4
This was the state of mind for much of
Germany beginning immediately after the conclusion of World War I and leading
up to Hitler’s official entrance onto a larger political stage in January of 1933
when he was appointed to the Chancellorship of Germany by then-President
Hindenberg. In general terms, “the
themes which link how the Nazis captured power in 1933 with what Nazi Germany
did in the years thereafter appear to be the following: war, racism, violence,
and order. Each figure prominently in
the history of German society and polity between 1918 and 1933.”6 This article goes on the declare that,
taking these four specific factors into consideration, the dissolving of the
Weimar Republic may be explained as may the rise of Hitler and his Nazi Party.6 As we
have observed, multiple factors helped bring the German people to the point of
accepting the radical Nazi Party under the control of Adolf Hitler as their
preferred form of government. It was a
gradual process, a slow redefinition of accepted norms born out of fear,
frustration, and extensive deprivation.
As a further example of just how serious the situation had become within Germany, its economic sector had reached such a point of consternation and anxiety that the former president of the Reichsbank issued a letter to President Hindenberg admonishing German men to join the Nazi Storm Troopers. This former bank president argued that Hitler gaining the Chancellorship would be best for Germany. Johannes Zahn, economist and banker in Germany since 1931, states that “You have to consider Germany’s general situation between 1930 and 1933. An unemployed man either joined the Communists, or he became a Storm Trooper. And so business believed it was better if these people became Storm Troopers because there was discipline and order, and at the beginning you couldn’t tell whether National Socialism (the Nazis) was something good with a few bad side effects or something evil with a few good side effects.”4
One of the happenings that helped bring
Germany to such a point was the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in
1919. As the new German government
attempted to organize and pull itself together, dissention among multiple
political parties extended so far that it severely hampered the education of
its nation’s young people thereby creating a destructive atmosphere of
ignorance: an atmosphere that eventually became a habit. Interviews with and direct quotes from
original Nazi Party members in Germany from 1929-1945 explain vividly and
succinctly just how a nation forced to its knees would readily accept a
relative madman as their leader if only he could make life better for
them.
The Germans that opted for Hitler’s
regime were not stupid. They were
victims systematically reduced to severe desperation by multiple factors over
time. Under such extreme circumstances, a strong personality promising them
salvation in the form of a happy, healthy, productive life for themselves,
their families, and their communities likely seemed their best—if not their only—option.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
Author Unknown, “German Schools and the Teaching of the War,” Literary Digest, May 6,
1922, 48, accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/1920s_german_schools_teaching_ww1_pdf.
2.
Author Unknown, “The Political Crises in Post-War Germany,” Current Opinion, September
1919, 140, accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.oldmagazinearticles.com/GERMAN_REVOLUTION-1919_pdf.
3.
David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft:
Constructing a People’s
Community,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 39, no. 2 (2004): 213-238,accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180722.
4.
Directed by Laurence Rees, The Nazis: A
Warning From History (BBC Warner,
2005), DVD
disc
1.
5.
Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly,
vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn, 1950):
419-442, accessed March 11, 2012 ,http://www.jstor.org/stable/2745999.
6.
Richard Bessel, “The Nazi Capture of Power,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 39,
No. 2 (April, 2004): 169-188,
accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180720.
No comments:
Post a Comment